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ECONOMIC TIPPING: AN APPROACH TO A
BALANCED NEIGHBORHOOD
I. Introduction
In the recent decision of Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v.
Romney,' a court, for the first time, was confronted with a proposal
to apply a "tipping" standard solely on the basis of income, rather
than racial grounds. The case involved a group of middle-income
residents seeking to enjoin the State and City of New York, as well
as the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from
increasing an area's low-income population through the building of
various housing projects.' "Tipping" has been defined as "that
point at which a set of conditions has been created that will lead to
the rapid flight of an existing majority class under circumstances of
instability which result in the deterioration of the neighborhood
environment." 3
The court in Trinity refused plaintiffs' request to expand the
tipping doctrine to include economic classifications because of the
absence of legal precedent for such an argument and the inherent
difficulty in expressing the tipping concept in economic terms.' Al-
though one court has recognized and accepted the concept of racial
tipping,5 no court has extended this concept into the area of econom-
ics.' Because all forms of tipping are relatively new concepts, parties
using this argument must generally be wary of other problems; i.e.,
1. 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, No. 75-7061 (2d Cir. July 24, 1975).
2. Roland N. Karlen, Alvin C. Hudgins, residents of the area, and the Committee of
Neighbors to Insure a Normal Urban Environment (CONTINUE), another community group
representing area residents, intervened as plaintiffs. Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council,
Inc. intervened as defendants. Id. at 1047 n.2.
3. Id. at 1065-66.
4. Id. at 1064.
5. Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973). In the interest of
preserving the desirable qualities of a certain district, the court prevented the influx of
potential tenants of low-income projects where it had been established that their presence
would detrimentally affect the racial composition of the area. But see Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), judgment ordered, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D.
Ill.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971). For extensive
examination of the racial tipping concept, see Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World:
Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw.U.L. REV. 363 (1966);
Note, The Benign Housing Quota: A Legitimate Weapon to Fight White Flight and Resulting
Segregated Communities?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 891 (1974); 85 HARV. L. REV. 870 (1972).
6. See Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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questions of standing7 and the evidentiary validity of sociological
data and research statistics.' These parties, recognizing the legal
weaknesses of a tipping theory, have also added equal protection9
arguments where possible to encourage the courts to accept their
position. Therefore, to be persuasive, an economic tipping argument
should be fashioned after an argument for racial tipping.
II. Racial Tipping
The concept of racial tipping in integrated neighborhoods is a new
development in the law. Historically, racial segregation issues have
generally been decided in favor of increased integration, without
judicial consideration of the effects of such policies on the existing
population." In Otero v. New York City Housing Authority," how-
7. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (no standing where petitioner asserts
no individualized harm to itself or its members); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (a
petitioner with adequate incentive has standing to assert the rights of third parties, particu-
larly where the third parties have no forum in which to assert their own rights); Association
of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (standing for those
who show injury in fact and that the interest sought to be protected is within the zone of
interest to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (standing for those injured by operation of the
statute).
8. See Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See
also Fahr & Ojemann, The Use of Social and Behavioral Science Knowledge in Law, 48 IowA
L. REV. 59 (1962). In referring to lawyers' attitudes towards the social sciences, the authors
state that the legal profession is "opposed to granting any very large amount of credence to
evidence amassed by psychologists, sociologists, psychiatrists, and the like." Id. at 60. Many
lawyers recognize the potentialities of using these disciplines but "remain dubious as to
applying them to legal matters." Id. However, other writers have pointed out that the courts
are increasingly utilizing such disciplines, at least in certain circumstances: "Judges may be
especially prone to use social science research when opinions attempt to break with precedent;
in those situations, social science research may be used to buttress the view that social reality
demands a reevaluation of the law." Lochner, Some Limits on the Application of Social
Science Research in the Legal Process, 1973 LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 815, 835. This quotation
might well be relevant to future cases concerning issues analogous to those in the Trinity case.
But cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in which the Court used sociological
data to find that the plaintiffs were deprived of equal protection by the defendant's segrega-
tory practice. Brown, however, was a landmark case. Unlike many Supreme Court decisions
which are evolutionary or merely modifications in a trend, Brown was a radical turnabout in
outlook to a constitutional right. Thus, without any precedent to draw from, sociological data
was a primary tool used to buttress the Court's decision. For a more detailed discussion of
the use of sociological data, see text accompanying notes 68-76 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 78-82 infra.
10. In Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972) where 90 percent of families on
waiting lists for federally-assisted housing were black, the failure of Cleveland's Metropolitan
Housing Authority (MHA) to place a majority of new public housing in white neighborhoods
ever, the Second Circuit added a new dimension to the integration
problem.
The Otero decision dealt with 360 units in two low-income apart-
ment buildings supervised by the Housing and Development
Agency (HDA) with federal assistance from HUD. In order to con-
struct the complex, HDA relocated 1,852 families, but promised to
give these people priority to return when the project was finished.
However, the agency received an unusually large number of respon-
ses to its offer, and, therefore, decided against accomodating a por-
tion of those families who accepted the prior invitation. The evi-
dence indicated that normally only four percent of relocated fami-
lies seek occupancy in the newly constructed buildings, but in this
case 27 percent of the former tenants were interested in obtaining
apartments. In the interest of preventing racial tipping of the neigh-
borhood, the HDA leased only 161 of the 360 units to former site
occupants. Furthermore, it chose to ignore or reject the applications
of 322 other former residents, most of whom were non-whites. Sub-
sequently, the HDA rented the remaining dwellings to outsiders,
most of whom were white. As a result, minority tenants wishing
relocation filed a complaint against the HDA and HUD under the
Civil Rights Act of 1968."2
The plaintiffs obtained summary judgment at the district court
level" where defendants were permanently enjoined from leasing to
outsiders until they first fulfilled their obligation of providing for all
present and former site occupants. 4 However, the court of appeals
reversed on the ground that genuine issues of fact existed as to the
tipping effect of a high concentration of non-whites in the neighbor-
constituted a violation of federal public housing and civil rights statutes.
In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969) the district court
judge found significant the fact that except for four projects with quotas for black residents,
almost all tenants in projects controlled by the Chicago Housing Authority were black and
the overwhelming majority of the family units under the Authority's jurisdiction were located
in black areas.
Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971) aff 'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) held
that denial of building permits for apartments by Fulton County upon discovery that apart-
ments would be occupied by low-income black tenants was violative of the equal protection
clause.
11. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir.), rev'g 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
12. Id. at 1125-26.
13. Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
14. Id. at 957.
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hood. 5 The court held that the defendants obviously had a duty to
integrate, but in certain circumstances this obligation may be car-
ried out by limiting the number of apartments available to minority
groups. "e
Two contradictory factors governed the tenants' assignment pol-
icy of the defendants. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, housing
authorities had a duty to integrate.'7 However, the defendant was
also subject to a regulation granting first preference in renewal hous-
ing to present and former residents from the original urban renewal
site.'" The court of appeals reconciled these two objectives by decid-
ing that defendant could suspend its priority regulation and refuse
to give non-white former residents an apartment in the new project
if it were deemed necessary to preserve the racial balance.'" It rea-
soned that instead of simply benefiting minority groups, the pur-
pose of racial integration should be advantageous to the community
as a whole. 0 In writing for the majority, Judge Mansfield stated:'
15. 484 F.2d at 1140. If all the tenants who were to be relocated in the project had been
given priority, there could have been a large influx of minority persons, and, as the defendants
argued, a corresponding exodus of whites from the community.
16. Id.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970).
18. GM 1810: Regulations of the New York City Housing Authority Governing Admission
to Public Housing. See 344 F. Supp. 748-49 (appendix).
19. 484 F.2d at 1140.
20. Id. The development of integration policy has undergone a significant number of
transitions over the years. For example, in the early decision of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896) the Court introduced the "separate but equal" doctrine. This policy guaranteed
for all practical purposes that the initial public housing projects would be racially segregated.
However, in later years the Court discarded the Plessy holding and instituted a plan of
judicially enforced integration. Brown v. Board of Educ., 374 U.S. 483 (1954). In addition,
state legislatures drafted statutes banning discrimination against racial, ethnic, or religious
groups. See, e. g., N.Y. PUB. HOUSING LAW § 223 (McKinney 1955): "[N]o person shall,
because of race, creed, color or national origin, be subjected to any discrimination."
To facilitate the promotion of integrated public housing in particular, the authorities
utilized strategic site selection and affirmative tenant assignment, to govern priority of ad-
mission to public housing. See Note, Racial Discrimination in Public Housing Site Selection,
23 STAN. L. REV. 63, 69 (1970). Besides integrating neighborhoods which previously had been
exclusively white, the goal of the housing projects was to eliminate deteriorating, substandard
housing. Id. Frequently members of the white community expressed anxiety concerning the
authority's plans, and the government was aware of this opposition. Hearings Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, De Facto Segregation and Housing
Discrimination, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2971 (1970) (statement of Anthony Downs). Despite the
reluctance of individuals to accept such methods of forced integration, the housing authorities
have relied on constitutional and statutory guidelines in the carrying out of their plans.
Despite the judicial and legislative ideal of complete integration, it has been recognized that
[Vol. IV
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We disagree as to the district court's interpretation of the Authority's duty
to integrate. We do not view that duty as a "one-way street" limited to
introduction of non-white persons into a predominantly white community.
The Authority is obligated to take affirmative steps to promote racial integra-
tion even though this may in some instances not operate to the immediate
advantage of some non-white persons.
Another crucial factor in the Otero decision was the court's ac-
ceptance of the use of a quota system"2 as an indication of the limit
for community integration. Many federal and state decisions have
utilized racial quotas and sociological data. 3 Cases involving dis-
crimination in education and employment in particular have used
such statistics in reaching their result. 4 On the other hand, there
have been some state court decisons which have exhibited a reluct-
ance to accept any use of racial quotas or empirical data in formu-
lating an opinion. 5 These cases have attempted to rely solely on
legal tests rather than statistical ones.
Otero is one case which made use of racial quotas in deciding
issues involving housing. Its true significance, however, lies in the
in the interim between the groundbreaking and the completion of the projects, the area
undergoes a radical change due to fleeing whites, who fear the increase in crime and decrease
in property values which they associate with the influx of non-whites. In reference to the flight
of middle-class whites from New York City, see N.Y. Times, May 29, 1973, at 1, col. 5.
21. 484 F.2d at 1125.
22. Id.
23. In Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (Ch. 1954), the Housing
Authority of Elizabeth, N.J. admitted blacks to projects under their control on the basis of a
quota system, with the percentage of units allocated to blacks corresponding to the approxi-
mate percentage of the black population in that city. In Banks v. Housing Auth., 120 Cal.
App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954), the Housing Authority of
the City and County of San Francisco allocated low rent housing accomodations on a 70/30
percent basis, to correspond with the needs of whites and non-whites, respectively, in sub-
standard housing. In both cases, the courts held these quotas to be violative of equal protec-
tion and the Housing Act. The holdings in the state and federal cases seem inconsistent. See
note 10 supra. However, the quota referred to in the state court decisions were invalidated
because they reinforced existing patterns of racial segregation in public housing. Contrast-
ingly, the limitation in Otero was intended to avoid causing the neighborhood to become
segregated. 484 F.2d at 1125. For instance, without such a quota the influx of minority groups
coupled with the flight of white families would culminate in a ghetto environment. Even
though the housing authority has a responsibility to integrate all white communities, it has
an attendant obligation to prevent the creation of a segregated black neighborhood.
24. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971)(edu-
cation); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972)
(employment).
25. See, e.g., Banks v. Housing Auth., 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954); Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (Ch. 1954).
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fact that unlike prior cases it used such statistics to put a ceiling
on integration rather than to promote it.
The difference between Otero and other cases involving integra-
tion can be demonstrated by comparing Otero with Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority." In Gautreaux, the court found that
the defendant housing authority's practice of selecting family public
housing sites which would maintain residential separation of racial
groups denied Negro plaintiffs their fourteenth amendment rights.
Plaintiffs established through statistics that the defendant imposed
illegal quotas in four housing projects in order to keep the number
of Negro tenants in such projects at a minimum." The court found
such conduct unacceptable," even in view of an atmosphere of racial
tension and acts of violence.
In Otero, the housing authority was not arbitrarily barring minor-
ity groups from applying for apartments in an exclusively white
neighborhood. 9 Instead, the area was already integrated, and the
population was nearly equally divided between whites and non-
whites. The defendant housing authority's purpose in denying per-
mission to plaintiff non-whites was not to foster racism, but "to
stem a steady decline in the percentage of the white population in
the community." 0 Thus, Otero's use of quotas was to preserve a
balanced integration rather than to foster more immediate increases
in the non-white population and an eventual flight of whites. The
housing authority had a duty to integrate according to a particular
quota, but at the same time had a corresponding responsibility to
prevent the creation of a segregated black neighborhood by integrat-
ing too much. The racial integration issue thus progressed from the
traditional view3 to a more sophisticated tipping analysis in Otero.
The legal theories which favor the acceptance of a racial tipping
26. 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
27. Id. at 909.
28. Id. at 915. Essentially this action arose because the non-whites wanted to move into
a white community.
29. I'n this case, the neighborhood already contained a racial mixture, and the defendants
wanted to stem the tide of non-white residents on the grounds "that large concentrations of
non-whites in one or more pockets within the community would act as a 'tipping factor' which
would precipitate an increase in the non-white population in the surrounding neighborhoods,
leading to a steady loss of total white population over a given period of time." 484 F.2d at
1133.
30. Id. at 1124.
31. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) (HUD has an affirmative duty to con-
sider impact of low-income housing on racial concentrations); Blackshear Residents Organi-
[Vol. IV
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standard are not easily applicable to economic tipping. In order for
state action to be presumed invalid, there must be an infringement
upon a fundamental right or discrimination against a protected
class.32 However, the right to housing is not considered fundamen-
tal,33 nor is wealth considered a suspect classification.34 Thus to
avoid these problems, it is tempting for a party to argue racial rather
than economic tipping.
III. Economic Tipping
A. The Trinity Case
As indicated above, the first case dealing with economic, as op-
posed to racial, tipping was Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v.
Romney.35 In that case the plaintiffs, a parochial school and a group
of middle-income brownstone residents,3" sought to enjoin HUD, the
State and City of New York, and a community group from increas-
ing the number of federally subsidized, low-income housing units
planned for the West Side Urban Renewal Area in Manhattan.3" The
West Side Urban Renewal Area was created in 19561s by the City of
New York to "preserve and improve the existing community so as
zation v. Housing Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (action must be taken to avoid
the increase of segregation, in ghettos, of racial groups whose lack of opportunity the Fair
Housing Act was designed to combat); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (an authority is barred from restricting non-whites to
areas already concentrated with non-whites); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F.
Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), judgment ordered, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 436 F.2d
306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971) (a tenant assignment policy which
assigns persons to a particular project because of the concentration of minorities already
present at the project is prohibited).
32. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
33. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). "Absent constitutional mandate, the assur-
ance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative,
not judicial functions." Id. at 74.
34. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973)(Stewart, J.,
concurring).
35. 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, No. 75-7061 (2d Cir. July 24, 1975).
The court of appeals did not discuss the issue of economic tipping.
36. Roland H. Karlen and Alvin C. Hudgins claimed breach of contract by the city for
failure to request their written consent before making changes in the plan. Id. at 1048.
37. The West Side Urban Renewal Area consists of a twenty square block community
from West 87th to West 97th Street, bounded by Central Park West and Amsterdam Avenue.
Id. at 1047.
38. In 1956, New York City applied for, and received, federal grant funds for a demonstra-
tion study of a 20 block area. These funds were granted under the Housing Act of 1954, 42
U.S.C.§§1452(a), 1453(a) (1970).
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to continue to accomodate the varied needs of its population." 9 The
West Side Urban Renewal Plan governing housing construction in
the area was intended to rehabilitate and renew the neighborhood."
Under its original plan, the renewal area was to allocate one-third
of the proposed housing construction to low-income residents.,,
Later, this plan was revised to accomodate some 2,500 more units
within the urban renewal area.42 This revision ultimately led to the
litigation in Trinity.
Plaintiffs in Trinity alleged that the city had breached its con-
tract with the Trinity Episcopal School, the sponsor of the housing
project, by revising the plan so as to allow a greater admission of
low-income families. 3 The plaintiff-intervenors argued that they
relied on the original West Side Renewal Plan when moving into the
area, and therefore the representations contained therein were en-
forceable against the city by the purchasers of property within the
community ."
The main argument put forth by plaintiffs was the tipping con-
tention, 5 which the trial court deemed to be the crux of the litiga-
tion.4" Plaintiffs primarily asserted that the "indiscriminate admis-
sion of relocatee low-income families" had caused the renewal area
to reach the "tipping-point," 7 whereby an increase in low-income
residents would tip the community's economic balance, causing the
flight of middle-income residents and the subsequent deterioration
of the neighborhood. 8
Plaintiffs recognized that the concept of tipping had been con-
fined to racial questions, but maintained that it could likewise be
applied to situations where the arrival of low-income groups would
cause middle-income residents to flee."9 They therefore requested
39. 387 F. Supp. at 1049.
40. Court Rules NEPA Impact Statement Not Required in Suit Concerning Public
Housing Site Selection, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 629 (1975).
41. 387 F. Supp. at 1047 n.3.
42. Id. at 1051.
43. Id. at 1048.
44. Id. at 1059-60.
45. Id. at 1048.
46. Id. at 1063.
47. Id.
48. Court Rules NEPA Impact Statement Not Required in Suit Concerning Public Hous-
ing Site Selecting, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 629 (1975).
49. 387 F. Supp. at 1064.
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the court to enjoin construction of all public housing in the
neighborhood and direct that low-income "squatters"5 be removed
from the area and that all new middle-income buildings observe a
housing ratio of 70/30 percent middle-low-income families as origi-
nally proposed in the plan.5'
The defendant's response to plaintiffs' allegations was that the
"'tipping phenomenon is a racial issue which relates to economics
only insofar as minority persons . . . are often associated with per-
sons of low income.' "52 Thus, the arguments used in the Otero deci-
sion were inapplicable.
Defendants were of course correct in pointing out that the tipping
argument is easy to apply to racial desegregation. Economic tipping
is more difficult to prove however. Unlike racial criteria which are
easily measurable, any definition of low income is imprecise. It de-
pends upon such arbitrary factors as income ceiling, family size, and
the cost of living. These are all ambiguous and difficult to measure.53
Although the Trinity court decided that plainttiffs had failed to
show that the neighborhood was in danger of tipping, and entered
judgment in favor of the defendants,54 Judge Cooper did not rule out
the use of economic tipping as a legal theory. He simply found a
failure of proof. He likewise pointed out some of the evidentiary
problems which future plaintiffs would encounter: 55
Even assuming arguendo, however, that tipping could be correlated with
an increase in the low income population of a neighborhood, the questions
are still raised as to what criteria should be considered in determining if the
tipping point has been, or is likely to be, reached, and what standard of proof
plaintiffs must meet in order to succeed. While community attitudes towards
an increasing presence of low income families must of necessity influence the
50. In the Spring of 1970, the same time that the sites were reclassified to low-income
housing, squatters occupied several buildings in the area awaiting demolition, including those
buildings on the reclassified sites. Id. at 1056.
51. Id. at 1047 n.3.
52. Id. at 1063.
53. Id. at 1065. In public housing, the maximum income limits of a low-income family
range from $6,100 for a one-member family to $10,200 for a seven-member family. However,
under criteria used for moderate-income housing, the corresponding figures are $8,235 and
$13,770. Id. The Housing Act vaguely defines families of low income as "families ... who
are in the lowest income group and who cannot afford to pay enough to cause private enter-
prise ... to build an adequate supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for their use."
42 U.S.C. §1402(2) (1970).
54. 387 F. Supp. at 1085.
55. Id. at 1065.
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stability of that community and are therefore relevant to a tipping analysis,
the gross numbers themselves should be considered only to the extent that
they are of a measurable group. Moreover, what is crucial is not the numbers
per se (except insofar as they affect community attitudes) but rather the
ability of the community from the standpoint of its services and facilities to
absorb and serve the needs of the particular group in question.
The court proceeded to establish factors for determining whether or
not an area has reached or is about to reach a tipping point. These
include: 5
(1) the gross numbers of minority group families or families in a measurable
economic or social group which are likely to affect adversely Area conditions;
(2) the quality of community services and facilities; and (3) the attitudes
of majority group residents who might be persuaded by their subjective reac-
tions to the first and second criteria to leave the Area.
Finally Judge Cooper stated that a persuasive tipping argument
would require "convincing evidence"57 that satisfied the standards
enunciated in Otero and Pride v. Community School Board."
56. Id. at 1066.
57. Id. The convincing evidence standard was also adopted in the Otero case. 484 F.2d at
1133-35.
58. 488 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1973). Pride involved assignment of school children away from
their neighborhood because of race. The circuit court implied that a less stringent "rational
basis test" be applied where racial classifications are used for benevolent purposes. Id. at 326-
27. The court in Pride stated that Otero had adopted a stricter standard because it involved
an outright denial of new public housing based entirely upon racial classifications: "Cases
applying that [stricter] standard invariably involve state action having a segregatory or
discriminatory effect. No court has applied the test where state action has had the effect
and objective of reducing discrimination and segregation." Id. at 326-27. See, e.g., Offermann
v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55,61 (6th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d
261,266 (1st Cir. 1965); Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1969), aff 'd, 431 F.2d 1254
(3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971); cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1972).
In Otero, Judge Mansfield, while discussing the evidentiary requirements in the stricter
standard, stated that: "the parties would be permitted to offer evidence as to the relevant
community, the impact of adherence to the priority regulation, including the declining white
population in that community, the effect of transfers from other locations in the community
to the ...Project, estimates as to the total racial composition of the Urban Renewal Area
upon completion, and the racial composition of the available population that is eligible for
public housing. Such evidence should permit the trial judge to make findings as to whether
adherence to . . .[the regulation] would tend to precipitate a racial imbalance which might
ultimately prevent the Authority from exercising its duty to maintain racial integration in
the community." 484 F.2d at 1137.
One reason for a strong "convincing evidence" standard in economic tipping cases is be-
cause of the constant shortage of low-income public housing. In view of the fact that housing
1975] NOTES
B. Future Status
Judge Cooper suggested that the economic tipping idea may have
merit in future litigation. Hence, he formulated certain standards."9
However, if "economic tipping" is ever to gain judicial recognition,
plaintiffs must overcome certain potential legal barriers. These in-
clude standing problems and reluctance of the judiciary to accept
economic and sociological data.
Courts have limited the classes of persons who may invoke the
decisional and remedial powers of the judiciary under the rubric of
standing. If the asserted harm is a "'generalized grievance' shared
in almost equally by a large class of citizen," then the injury rarely
warrants the exercise of the court's jurisdiction.'" At a minimum,
the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered sufficient "injury in
fact" to meet the "case or controversy" requirement of the United
States Constitution."
There are, however, additional limitations. 2 Nevertheless, it is far
is not a fundamental right, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, the requirement of a stricter
evidentiary standard provides additional protection to those in need of housing.
59. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
60. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975). See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
See also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
61. As to whether or not a party has standing to sue, the Supreme Court has stated that
in terms of constitutional limitations the plaintiff need only show that the dispute can be
presented in an adversary contest and is capable of judicial resolution. Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 101 (1968). Generally the courts have required that a party must show "injury in
fact," Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972), as a prerequisite to satisfying the
standing requirement. The guidelines for this test which usually relates to pecuniary interests
were set down in Flast. The Court required that the plaintiff, in this case a taxpayer,
"[F]irst, . . . establish a logical link between [his] status and the type of legislative enact-
ment attacked . . . . Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and
the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged." 392 U.S. at 102.
62. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2208-10 (1975). See also United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). Without the allegations of "de-
monstrable, particularized injury," there can be no confidence of "a real need to exercise the
power of judicial review," or that relief can be framed "no broader than required by the
precise facts to which the court's ruling would be applied." Warth v. Seldin, supra at 2210;
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974). "The fact that
the harm . . . may have resulted indirectly does not in itself preclude standing. When a
governmental prohibition or restriction imposed on one party causes specific harm to a third
party, . . . the indirectness of the injury does not necessarily deprive the person harmed of
standing .... " Warth v. Seldin, supra at 2208; accord Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124
(1973). "[Tlhis rule [denying relief to third persons] has not been imposed uniformly as a
firm constitutional restriction on federal court jurisdiction." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
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easier to meet the standing requirement today than it was ten years
ago. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co." provides an
illustration. In Trafficante the Supreme Court held that under the
Fair Housing Act of 1968, a white tenant had standing to protest
discrimination against non-whites." The Court found that "the loss
of important benefits from interracial associations" was a sufficient
allegation of injury." Since Trafficante, standing has been broad-
ened in Shannon v. HUD,"6 Otero, and Trinity to give neighborhood
civic associations the right to protest racial discrimination. 7 Thus,
by analogy to Shannon and Otero, a displacee, a tenant, a store-
owner, or a church and school located within a neighborhood would
all be likely to have standing to sue a housing authority.
Another problem with the economic tipping argument is the re-
luctance of the judiciary to accept economic and sociological data.68
Before any economic tipping standard can be developed, the income
approach must be removed from the realm of speculation; it must
n.20 (1968). For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) a Catholic school
was allowed to attack a statute which would have forced all children to receive a public
education. Furthermore, organizations have been allowed to assert the constitutional rights
of their members. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958); Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Increasingly, the courts have
conferred standing, so long as the party can show himself to be within this "zone of interests."
Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
In Data Processing the Court announced a two part test for standing. Standing exists if the
plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury and if "the interest sought
to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or
regulated by the statute of constitutional guarantee in question." Id.
63. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
64. Id. at 212.
65. Id. at 209-10.
66. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). In Shannon a group of black and white residents, and
representatives of civic organizations sought to enjoin HUD from building a project on the
grounds that the authority violated the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments. The court granted standing to the plaintiffs on the premise that they
would be vitally affected by HUD's program, despite the fact that they were not displacees
or potential occupants. Id. at 818. This approach allowed a larger portion of the population
to challenge HUD's urban renewal decision, and greatly expanded the standing requirement
beyond previous limitations. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1968) (standing granted to a displacee to challenge a relocation plan); Hicks v.
Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969) (potential occupant had standing to challenge
segregatory location of housing). But see Fletcher v. Romney, 323 F. Supp. 189, 194 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (standing denied on ground that alleged injury was less direct than suffered in
Shannon).
67. For a discussion of zone of interest and third party standing, see note 62 supra.
68. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
NOTES
be as discernible and documented as the racial approach.
Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Association v. Lynn 9 illustrated
this problem and the judicial reaction. In that case, plaintiffs sought
to compel HUD to file an environmental impact statement detailing
the social and economic characteristics of the proposed tenants be-
fore it constructed a housing project. 0 The court rejected this de-
mand, and stated:"
Prognosticating human behavior and analyzing its consequences on the
environment is an especially difficult, if not impossible, task. . . Sociology,
a discipline attempting such prediction, has not yet attained the stage of an
exact science .... As such, these conclusions are not very persuasive in a
court of law.
While Nucleus did not deal with a tipping argument, the opinion
illustrates the general reluctance of courts to consult sociological
data in order to determine the effect of low-income families upon
the neighborhood environment. Although the majority of courts do
not presently recognize research compiled by sociologists, some
commentators have argued that such data is worthwhile and should
be resorted to in certain circumstances.72 Other writers have voiced
a fear of placing too much credence in a sociological report.73 Never-
theless, the only means of effectively determining whether a neigh-
borhood has in fact "tipped" is to rely upon the figures produced
by an investigation. Seemingly, the courts have utilized such data
in the racial tipping context to implement the constitutional guar-
antees and the relevant statutory provisions.75
Judge Cooper's decision in Trinity considered sociological stan-
dards only in conferring jurisdiction, and consequently did not need
to rely solely upon the sociologist's findings in reaching a decision
on the merits." Plaintiffs in Trinity argued that the equal protection
and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment were violated.
69. 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
70. Id. at 148. The filing of environmental impact statements is governed by the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
71. 372 F. Supp. at 150.
72. See note 8 supra.
73. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. See also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1107 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
74. See Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1179-80 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
75. See, e. g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Blackshear Residents Organi-
zation v. Housing Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
76. 387 F. Supp. at 1048.
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However, the court did not discuss these issues. If the court had
concluded that those amendments were violated, it may have incor-
porated the sociological research to buttress its decision." The Su-
preme Court has declared that the equal protection clause is vio-
lated only when laws are invidiously discriminatory, with classifica-
tions that are wholly arbitrary or capricious."8
Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in
enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others.
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional powers
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it.7
This presumption of validity disappears when legislation discrimi-
nates against "suspect classifications."" ° Race is a prime example of
a suspect classification.' Wealth is not.82
If future litigants are going to succeed in their attempts to estab-
lish economic tipping, they must either convince the court of the
value of the sociological report or effectively couple such statistics
with a constitutional argument. Moreover, they must establish a
separate income class which is discernible from a racial classifica-
tion and meet the burden of proving their case by "clear and con-
vincing evidence," as required in Otero and Trinity.
IV. Conclusion
The decision in Trinity, although rejecting the concept of eco-
nomic tipping, as applicable to the facts of that case, opens the door
to the development of judicial policy in this area. Future litigation
77. See Lochner, Some Limits on the Application of Social Research in the Legal Process,
1973 LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 815, 836.
78. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973)(Stewart, J.,
concurring).
79. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
80. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
81. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535 (1973) (illegitimacy); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)(alienage); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)(indigency); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national
origin).
82. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973).
[Vol. IV
1975] NOTES 181
on this issue will have both precedent and guidelines 3 with which
to work. However, in view of the strict evidentiary requirements and
the ever-present judicial distaste for sociological evidence, plaintiffs
will face a rigorous challenge.
Frank J. Allocca
83. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973).

